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21 August 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## SOUTH VIETNAM



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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: During the past few days, Viet Cong units have again conducted a series of small-scale attacks in areas close to Saigon, after a week of relative inactivity in this region. After executing a mortar and automatic weapons barrage, an estimated two Viet Cong companies reportedly penetrated a hamlet nine miles west of Saigon, inflicting heavy casualties among the defenders.

Three other villages east of the capital were also subjected to automatic weapons and small arms fire, although apparently only light casualties resulted. The defenders of one hamlet reported killing eight Viet Cong while engaging an estimated three enemy platoons.

In Kontum Province, Viet Cong forces directed a mortar bombardment on the district town of Dak To during the night of 19-20 August. No casualties, however, were reported among the inhabitants. Dak To is the only district town in the province north of Kontum city still under government control; it is located 17 miles southeast of Dak Sut, which was overrun by a Viet Cong battalion on 19 August.


Elsewhere, US Marines yesterday continued mopping-up operations after their major battle with the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in northeast Quang Ngai Province. No significant changes in the number of casualties have been reported for either side. According to the US Military Command, both the defensive maneuvering of the Communist regiment during the operation and the amount of communications equipment later uncovered tend to confirm previous information on the sophistication of the Viet Cong command and control system.

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There are indications of increasing restiveness among the Buddhists in Tri Quang's central Vietnam stronghold, partly in the form of local political pressure on the commander of I Corps, General Thi. [redacted]

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[redacted] Tri Quang now intends to launch a series of antigovernment political activities, possibly including protest meetings and student agitation designed to show that the government is unpopular and ineffective.]

Communist Political Developments: There has as yet been no significant Communist propaganda reaction to the US Marine victory over Communist forces in the Chu Lai area from 18-20 August. According to press reports, Hanoi radio claimed on 20 August that the Viet Cong had repulsed a big US "raid" in the area.

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Dominican Republic: The OAS Committee is having difficulty getting the rebels to accept its proposals with only minor changes.

Negotiations currently center on devising a procedure for dismantling the rebel zone which takes account of the rebels' fear that they will be "invaded" by the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). In the background are other issues on which rebel obstructionists like Jottin Cury and Hector Aristy take a hard line, such as control of the military and the departure date of the IAPF.

Relative moderates in the rebel camp seem fearful of pushing the extremists to accept a settlement. One leader of Bosch's party has said "certain political forces" among the rebels are trying to tar the party as being eager for any solution.

Imbert has proposed that the OAS Committee give the rebels a final text of its terms for settlement and if they are rejected, suspend negotiations and mobilize public opinion to force acceptance. Imbert feels that if the rebels then resist, overwhelming public support would make prompt installation of an interim regime possible. An obstacle to such a plan has been the reluctance of Hector Garcia Godoy to assume the provisional presidency without at least some support among the rebels.

[UN Special Representative Jose Mayobre continues to involve himself in activities that exceed his mandate, which is to observe the enforcement of the cease-fire. He has discussed restructuring of the Dominican armed forces with Caamano and has asked one of his own aides to draw up plans.]

[Ambassador Bunker considers UN involvement in such a role likely to be prejudicial to US interests. Mayobre's actions have reinforced Bunker's view that the UN mission should be ended after the formation of a provisional government.]

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Greece: Former premier Papandreu's political tour of the countryside, scheduled to start today, will probably touch off new demonstrations against the monarchy.

Papandreu has said that the trip is not designed to provoke violence. However, recent demonstrations have been increasingly violent and antimonarchical, and may indicate a loss of discipline among his followers.

The demonstrations have also appeared more and more to be led by Communists, although Papandreu has not openly solicited their support. So far Communist leaders have urged their followers against using violence for fear of repressive action by the security forces.

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USSR-Turkey: The USSR has again offered to provide Turkey with sizable economic aid.

According to Prime Minister Urguplu, Moscow is willing to supply factories and other installations worth \$150 to \$180 million. Another Turkish official has said that repayment in Turkish commodities would be over 15 years at two and one-half percent interest. Steel, petroleum, aluminum, glass, tractor, and vodka factories are potential Soviet aid projects, but the Turks are to submit specific proposals within the next six months.

Over the past five years Moscow's intermittent credit offers to Turkey have ranged from \$200 to \$500 million. To date Turkey has accepted only about \$7 million which has been used to buy road construction equipment and to build a glass factory and several textile plants.

However, the gradually improving relations with the USSR and a desire to draw down their favorable trade balance and find a market for surplus agricultural products may make the Turks now more receptive to the Soviet offer than they have been in the past.

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\*USSR-US: The deterioration in Soviet-US relations caused by the Vietnam conflict is beginning to have a marked impact on the implementation of cultural exchange programs.

Ambassador Kohler has commented that a harsher Soviet attitude, which has been highlighted in recent weeks by a number of sharp attacks on the US by Soviet leaders, represents Moscow's considered reaction to President Johnson's 28 July statements on plans to step up US support in Vietnam.

Kohler feels that the Soviet decision to stall on a number of scheduled cultural exchanges reflects a policy decision which may lead to the cancellation of some exchanges already under contract. There have even been implied threats to stop circulation of the US cultural magazine Amerika.

The Soviet shift to a harder line toward the US was foreshadowed in Premier Kosygin's 21 July comments to Governor Harriman that Vietnam cannot help but have its reflection on all bilateral matters as "the situation hamstrings us, and you as well, all along the line."

Nevertheless, Kohler feels that the Soviet Government will continue to keep the deterioration in relations within carefully defined limits. He concludes that the USSR is proceeding with great caution to avoid a direct confrontation with the US in Vietnam. For the Soviet Union to shift to a posture of extreme militant antagonism toward the US would also play directly into Chinese Communist hands and concede them a major victory.

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